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FOREWORD
Security transformation is vital for the United States to promote
national security in rapidly changing times, but it is also a moving
target. American policymakers and strategists must, on a regular
basis, reassess the global security environment and the trajectory of
transformation. One of the most signiﬁcant of such reassessments
is currently underway, driven by Operations IRAQI FREEDOM
and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, continuing technological
developments, budget constraints, and the debate associated with
the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review.
To provide senior defense leaders with ideas on security
transformation, the Strategic Studies Institute has joined with
the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard
University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government to bring together
top experts on an annual basis. For the third meeting in this series—
held in November 2004—the National Defense University joined as
a partner. The informed and free ﬂowing debate at this conference
generated a range of frank assessments and creative ideas about the
status of security transformation.
This report summarizes the debates and ﬁndings of the November
session. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer it as a
contribution to the ongoing debate on security transformation and
the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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TRANSFORMATION FOR WHAT?
Key Insights.
• Stability and reconstruction (S&R) operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan and the war on terrorism have slowed the pace
of the transformation programs.
• The government is making little progress in building an
effective intergovernmental capacity for stability and
reconstruction operations.
• The Department of Defense (DoD) budget is unlikely to be
adequate to meet both the needs of continuing operations and
transformation during the coming years.
• In light of the likely budget constraints, it is vital that DoD
undertake a fundamental reassessment of the alignment of
the force structure (especially expensive new platforms) to
anticipated threats.
• DoD has a vital role to play in homeland security but the
department is not engaged in the interagency process and
is not adequately planning for needed homeland security
capabilities.
The Report.
The third annual conference on security transformation was
held on November 18-19, 2004, at the National Defense University
(NDU). The conference was organized by the Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs (BCSIA) at Harvard University’s
John F. Kennedy School of Government. It brought together current
and former defense ofﬁcials and military commanders to discuss
progress in achieving transformation of U.S. national security. The
Army War College, NDU, and BCSIA sponsored the conference.
The purpose of this annual conference is to examine progress in
achieving national security transformation. The fundamental idea
of transformation is that changes in the geopolitical environment
and in technology require the United States to change dramatically
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its defense enterprise to meet the range of new national security
threats by adopting new technologies and operational procedures.
Transformation affects DoD and all other agencies involved in
national security. It is a broad concept that encompasses change in
doctrine, technology, and business practices and should be seen as a
continuous process.
This year’s discussion centered on factors that are slowing the
process of transformation: managing the stability and reconstruction
(S&R) operations that are now on-going in Afghanistan and Iraq; the
outlook for the defense budget; the implications of a change to the
nature of the future threat on the future force structure; and slow
progress on homeland security.
Stability and Reconstruction Operations.
The Operation IRAQI FREEDOM experience demonstrates
the difﬁculty we continue to have in carrying out successful S&R
operations. This deﬁciency is particularly serious because past
evidence (in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo) suggests that Iraq
is not the last time that our nation will be involved in peacemaking
and peacekeeping operations. Astonishingly, we have not found a
way to build an effective S&R capability that brings together the
necessary elements of organization, resources, and operational
control. A central difﬁculty is that successful S&R operations require
the involvement of the Department of State as well as domestic
agencies, for example, the Departments of Justice, Homeland
Security, and Health and Human Services, with expertise in public
health, public safety, infrastructure repair, and civil government.
But these agencies currently do not have the authority, mission, and
resources to participate in peacekeeping operations.
At the conference, one presenter outlined a plausible way for the
United States to achieve such a capability that involved establishing
executive authority in the National Security Council for coordinating
S&R efforts. A second presenter stressed the need to include
peacekeeping considerations in advance of military operations
(through the use of “soft power”) to ease the problems of posthostility occupation. It was noted that today’s enemy is intelligent,
aggressive, and, most importantly, highly innovative.
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However, as the failure of passage of the Lugar-Biden legislation
(that sought to authorize a modest step in creating an ofﬁce in
the Department of State devoted to coordinating post-conﬂict
occupation) illustrates, no signiﬁcant change should be anticipated
soon. Little progress has been made since the last conference where
we concluded that a better way is urgently needed for the United
States to carry out peacekeeping operations. The absence of progress
is more surprising since the attributes of a successful organization
for stability are clear and well-acknowledged. They include:
• A division of labor among the various agencies and a deﬁnition
of the DoD role, with appropriate authorities and funding;
• A mechanism for effective interagency cooperation;
• Strong leadership at the center from the National Security
Council and Ofﬁce of Management and Budget;
• A management concept for stability operations with someone
in charge, including provision for international participation;
and,
• A program for building capacity, especially in domestic
agencies, with an innovative focus.
The S&R operations in Iraq and Afghanistan do have aspects that
are helpful for modernization. Field operations give the opportunity
for “little t” transformation based on quick adaptation to technology
by operating forces. This adaptation is especially valuable because
the transformation usually focuses on joint operations, the measures
frequently are not costly, and the process circumvents the more
cumbersome “big T” transformation process associated with
new platforms. Various suggestions were made to strengthen the
“little t” transformation process, for example, greater reliance on
the acquisition system used by the Special Operations Command
(SOCOM), and greater use of special limited acquisition authorities
by joint commands to fund ﬁeld “experiments.” Such changes would
assure ﬁeld trials of new systems before their ﬁnal speciﬁcation.
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Budget Outlook.
Participants discussed at length the outlook for the defense
budget. Although the United States can well afford devoting a
larger share of the gross domestic product (GDP) to defense (and
has consistently done so in the past), participants generally expected
that defense budgets were unlikely to continue to grow, and indeed
might decline. The external factors leading to this expectation of
pressure on the defense budget were the twin budget and trade
deﬁcits, anticipated continued growth in nondiscretionary federal
expenditures, reform of Social Security and other entitlement
programs, and increased demand for discretionary spending,
including for homeland security.
Also, internal pressures on the defense budget suggest that
resources for the investment accounts—procurement and research
and development (R&D)—will be constrained. These pressures
include the apparently inexorable increase in operations and
maintenance expenditures per soldier (in part due to continually
growing beneﬁts packages), the call for increased Army and
Marine force strength for Iraq and beyond, the high cost of the Iraq
deployment, and deferred cost of replacement and reconstitution
of the equipment used in Iraq. Participants noted that a signiﬁcant
portion of the Army’s modernization program is being funded by
supplementals to the DoD base budget. The supplements will cease
when the Iraqi occupation ends, and the Army may well be left with
unfunded modernization requirements.
Conference participants were skeptical, to varying degrees, that
resources would be available to fund the currently programmed
modernization programs, especially for costly platforms (ships,
tactical aircraft) and the Army’s Future Combat System. Estimates
varied, but one knowledgeable observer suggested a funding
shortfall of 20 percent to 30 percent, based on current program cost
estimates. Participants made suggestions of activities that should be
terminated or missions that should be abandoned. One participant
did suggest that the research, development, test, and evaluation
budget may offer an opportunity for savings; this budget category
has grown, especially because of large development programs.
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The choices that face us if the DoD budget does not continue to
grow are all difﬁcult:
• Change the U.S. role in the world by reducing missions;
• Renegotiate beneﬁts in the all-volunteer force;
• Reduce force structure; and,
• Reduce the content of modernization programs.
Assessing the choices requires an inquiry about the composition and
extent of forces needed to meet future threats.
Alternative Force Postures.
If resources are unlikely to be adequate to meet current force
modernization plans, then it is necessary to examine the basis of
the need for the forces. Participants generally agreed that such an
examination has not been undertaken recently; however, they did
not directly address possible alternative force structures or the pros
and cons of the force structure implicit in the current DoD 5-year
ﬁnancial plan. There were several important interventions about
the need to examine whether the current force structure properly
meets the needs of realistic future security threats. This situation
underscores the need for a fundamental review of the future mission
set, post-Iraq, and implications for the future force structure and
joint warﬁghting systems. In particular, a better balance between
expensive new platforms and network centric systems is needed and
necessary to meet these future threats.
The mandated Quadrennial Defense Review that is due in 2005 is
seen as having become a bureaucratic exercise in which the services
and other DoD elements work to defend their programs and
interests rather than a forum for examining the fundamental basis
of the defense posture: the relationship of forces to likely future
threats and security missions. For example, what will be needed for
counterterrorism and peacekeeping operations relative to the need
for broad based deterrence and conventional combat capabilities?
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Homeland Security.
All agreed on the urgent necessity for the country to counter
terrorism and increase our homeland security. Last year, our
discussion noted that while establishment of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) was the single most important step
that the government has taken to meet the threat of catastrophic
terrorism, considerable time and effort would be required to build
an integrated capability that involved both domestic and national
security agencies. This year, one knowledgeable participant argued
that progress in mounting a coordinated effort has proven slower
than expected, in large part because of DoD’s failure to engage
seriously in its role in homeland security. It appears that the current
DoD leadership has decided, perhaps because of the pressure of Iraq
or perhaps fearing a raid on the DoD budget, not to engage actively
in the government-wide process to strengthen homeland security,
other than through force protection.
We must conclude that, as yet, there is no agreement on what
the DoD’s role will be in homeland security or, in DoD terms,
homeland defense. There are many examples where DoD can and
must play a role: (1) terminal air defense within CONUS, (2) longrange maritime interdiction beyond Coast Guard capabilities, (3)
participation in high stress hostage rescue teams’ (HRTs) operations,
(4) contributions to domestic threat intelligence using approved DoD
sources of investigatory information, (5) protecting critical facilities
in high threat circumstances, and, most importantly, (6) assistance in
the response to an act of catastrophic terrorism, should it occur.
Other Defense Transformational Issues.
The conference addressed a number of additional transformational issues. Annually, we address Intelligence Support to Military
Operations. This year’s discussion was refreshing because it did not
address organizational issues and because the two presentations
highlighted, by comparison with other topics, the progress and
capability of intelligence support to military operations. One
presentation deﬁned the shift in the paradigm for distributing
intelligence from an “information push” to a web-based, internal
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protocol, “demand pull” approach. The arrangement requires high
bandwidth downlinks and lower bandwidth uplinks to hundreds of
reception points that, in turn, connect to local area networks. This shift
permits military commanders to draw on intelligence information
pertinent to their particular responsibilities. The new approach
offers the consumer the opportunity to specify what information is
of interest, while still permitting higher echelons of intelligence to
“push” new information with which the consumer is not familiar
through direct broadcast satellites.
The success of intelligence support to military operations is an
example of what can be achieved by transformation. The advances
that have come in the last 10 years reﬂect the change in the technology
balance between collection and the functions for tasking, processing,
exploiting, and communicating intelligence to military users. It is
noteworthy that this capability is available as support to military
operations, but does not exist as yet, at least to the same degree, for
support to national, i.e. non-DoD, intelligence users, or to homeland
security users.
Several participants raised concerns regarding weapons of mass
destruction. Some observed that, if keeping the worst weapons out of
the worst hands is a high priority, it seems that we may be focusing
on the worst people, but not doing much about the worst weapons.
The participants agreed that the transformation process must
cover the full spectrum of operations from concept development and
experimentation through the acquisition process to new concepts of
military operations in the ﬁeld.
The Army’s Problem.
The conference heard a good deal about how the Army
was approaching the three challenges of (1) managing the Iraq
deployment, (2) reconﬁguring Army forces to be more responsive to
the various contingencies that arise, and (3) planning and providing
resources for transformation to a future combat system that assures
strategic dominance. Participants were uniformly impressed by the
description of the Army’s shift to “modular forces” that permits
more ﬂexible and rapid assembly of “units of action” tailored to
particular contingencies. The Army is also giving considerable
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attention to streamlining logistics and ﬁnding the best way to carry
out spiral development in the evolution to the future combat system.
The difﬁculty is that the Army is under-resourced, and it is unlikely
to meet the three challenges cited above unless it receives a larger
share of DoD’s total obligational authority.
DoD Personnel Initiatives.
The Undersecretary for Personnel and Readiness delivered an
informative presentation about personnel initiatives of DoD for
both the civilian and uniformed workforce. It seems that, up to the
present, both military recruitment and retention rates of the services
are remaining ﬁrm for the active duty forces. Participants discussed
the prospects of reducing growing beneﬁt costs and expressed
differing views about the importance of beneﬁts to maintaining the
quality of the force. They noted that the Reserve and National Guard
are experiencing signiﬁcant change resulting from frequent call-ups
for S&R operations and from the requirements of homeland security.
Dr. Chu described a number of initiatives that are underway to adjust
the management of the reserve forces to meet current requirements.
Participants did not support the possibility of abandoning the AllVolunteer Force.
The Defense Industry.
A presentation of the state of the defense industrial base and DoD
defense industry policy as it relates to transformation prompted
much interest. The move to network centric warfare and the growing
concern with counterterrorism and S&R operations indicate a shift
away from platforms that have been the central focus of the large
defense contractors.
The management of transformation programs is changing.
DoD is less able to handle the technical and contracting aspects of
intensive networking in information technology; command, control,
communications and computing, intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (C4ISR); and joint warﬁghting projects that are at
the heart of transformation. The result is that DoD has been placing
greater reliance on major contractors to lead system integration
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contracts and federally funded research and development
corporations (FFRDCs) to manage system design and technology
selection for new programs. This marks a shift in responsibilities of
traditional government functions to industry. It is a critical aspect
of DoD acquisition policy that has not been adequately debated and
deserves attention.
The defense industry is also becoming increasingly concerned
about the health of the civilian defense industry workforce.
Progressive restrictions on defense industry practices—buy
American, export control regulations, the requirement for a U.S.
citizen workforce at both prime and subcontractors at a time when
the number of U.S. citizens graduating with science and engineering
degrees is declining, the shortage and delays in granting security
clearances for the workforce—create inefﬁciency in the industry and
make it progressively less attractive for our most talented young
people.
An additional problem—mentioned at earlier conferences—is the
restrictive technology transfer policies of DoD. One might assume that
at this time the country’s security interest and the defense industry’s
business interest were aligned toward encouraging the transfer of
transformation technologies to our allies and vice versa. In fact,
technology transfer has become more restrictive, and the restrictions
encourage the Europeans to pursue more costly independent
development instead of cooperating with U.S. ﬁrms. Major revisions
of our technology transfer and export control policies are certainly in
order. However, few participants believed that Congress will agree
to change what amounts to a thinly disguised protectionist policy.
Concluding Remarks.
The conference highlighted many aspects of security transformation, both positive and negative. Conference participants were
disappointed with the overall progress being made. But more telling
was the collective sense that we are not pursuing solutions broadly
enough in the full spectrum of military operations or deeply enough
in the technological and organizational responses to changing
requirements. After Iraq, what will DoD’s goals be and how will
they be fulﬁlled?
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